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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper address two policy questions: Do U.S. multinationals face a
different tax burden than companies that do business only in the U.S.?
Do U.S. multinationals face a different tax burden from multinationals
that are incorporated in other countries? These questions are important
because differences in tax burden can affect where firms incorporate (i.e.,
establish their legal domicile) and can entice them to relocate. Answers
to these questions may shed light on current policy issues, such as inver-
sions and responses to the World Trade Organization.
The paper reviews the extant empirical evidence related to inferences
of a U.S. multinational's "tax competitiveness" and offers new evidence
comparing the average tax rates of U.S. multinationals to both U.S. domes-
tics and to non-U.S. multinationals. In assessing evidence related to
This paper was prepared for presentation at the NBER conference on Tax Policy and the
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whether the U.S. tax system results in U.S. companies becoming attractive
takeover targets for non-U.S. companies, we review studies comparing
the tax liabilities of U.S. companies that are foreign-controlled to those
that are U.S.-controlled. We provide new data on the cost of U.S. domicile
for multinationals for the years 1992 to 1997. These new data update and
expand Collins and Shackelford (1995), which compared the average tax
rates of U.S. multinationals to domestic only companies' average tax rates
and to U.K. and Canadian multinationals' average tax rates during the
1980s. Because of substantial changes in international business and tax
since the 1980s, this update enables us to test whether what tax costs of
being a U.S. multinational have changed since then.
We find that companies domiciled in the U.S face higher tax burdens
than U.S. domestic-only companies, higher tax burdens than Canadian
multinationals, and similar tax burdens to British multinationals. Based
on our review of prior evidence and the new evidence presented here, the
evidence is consistent with at least some U.S. companies facing heavier tax
burdens because they are globally positioned.
1. INTRODUCTION
One of today's most controversial policy debates concerns the appropriate
taxation of U.S. multinationals. Although policymakers and corporate tax-
payers have wrestled with this issue for decades, it has become particu-
larly heated with the ruling by the World Trade Organization (WTO) that
current U.S. tax law includes an illegal export subsidy and with the recent
attention on corporate inversions, including an aborted one at Stanley
Works.
Understanding international taxation is no simple task. The numerous
complex rules that tax U.S.-domiciled multinationals on their worldwide
income and provide a foreign tax credit offset challenge the most experi-
enced tax experts. Some argue that these provisions are legally exploited
across multiple jurisdictions to create little to no tax burden, while others
argue that they create an onerous tax burden. This paper attempts to con-
tribute to the ongoing debate by reviewing prior empirical documentation
and providing new estimates of the tax cost of being a U.S. multinational.
Countries differ in their taxation of the foreign profits generated by
companies domiciled within their borders. Among other things, they vary
in whether they tax foreign income, their method for relieving interna-
tional double taxation, the ability to offset home country taxes on income
generated in one foreign jurisdiction with foreign taxes paid in another
jurisdiction, the sourcing of income and expenses across countries, and
their taxation of unrepatriated foreign income. These differences can af-Do U.S. Multinationals Face Different Tax Burdens? 143
feet where firms incorporate (i.e., establish their legal domicile) and can
entice them to relocate.
Determining the tax cost of being a U.S. multinational requires a bench-
mark for comparison. One comparison group is U.S. domestic-only com-
panies. For example, do U.S. multinationals face a different tax burden
than do companies conducting business only in the United States? Some
claim that U.S. multinationals engage in cross-border tax arbitrage, in-
come shifting, and other techniques that are unavailable to purely domes-
tic companies. Through legal exploitation of inconsistencies across
national tax systems, they face international nontaxation rather than dou-
ble taxation. Those holding this view encourage U.S. policymakers to re-
strict cross-border tax savings strategies to restore equitable tax levies on
U.S. multinationals.
A second comparison group is non-U.S. multinationals. Do U.S. multi-
nationals face a different tax burden from multinationals that are incorpo-
rated in other countries? Some argue that the U.S. burden is heavier. They
claim that the onerous tax burden faced by U.S. multinationals, compared
with non-U.S. multinationals, places U.S. companies in a competitive dis-
advantage in the market for corporate control. As a result, U.S. multi-
nationals become attractive takeover targets for non-U.S. investors,
potentially leading to a loss of U.S. jobs (see, for examples, reports by
Gnaedinger, Radziejewska, and Rojas, 2002). Those holding this view en-
courage U.S. policymakers to simplify the restrictions on foreign tax cred-
its and lower the taxation of non-U.S. income earned by U.S. companies.
For example, in explaining recent proposals from Congress to change the
interest allocation rules and the foreign-based sales company rules, for-
mer chief of staff for the Joint Committee, Kenneth Keis, states, "Represen-
tative Thomas is aware of the need to make tax policy changes so that
U.S. businesses are no longer attractive takeover targets" (reported by
Gnaedinger, Radziejewska, and Rojas, 2002, p. 176).
Why might there be a differential tax cost for U.S. multinationals? One
reason is that the United States, unlike some countries, taxes the world-
wide income of companies legally domiciled in its borders. To illustrate
how worldwide taxation works, Table 1 provides examples of how the
foreign profits of U.S. multinationals are taxed. Any foreign affiliate of a
U.S. corporation falls under the U.S. tax umbrella. If the foreign affiliate
is a branch, i.e., not separately incorporated in the foreign country, all of
its profits are immediately taxable by the United States. If the affiliate is
structured as a subsidiary, i.e., separately incorporated abroad, then only
amounts repatriated to the United States are taxable by the United States.
In either case, the affiliate will pay tax, at the foreign country's prevailing
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To alleviate double taxation on this income, the United States offers a
foreign tax credit to offset certain foreign taxable income. Foreign tax
credits are extremely complex in practice and a thorough discussion of
how they are computed is beyond the scope of this paper. Table 1 pro-
vides some simple examples, however, to show how foreign tax credits
can offset U.S. taxes.
Column I in Table 1 assumes that the corporation operates only a
branch in country A, where the tax rate is 15 percent, and generates profits
of $500 (column I). It remits a tax of $75 (15 percent of $500) to the govern-
ment of that country. The United States also taxes the same profit, which
generates tax due to the United States of $175 (35 percent of $500). To
offset the effects of the same $500 being taxed by both countries, the
United States offers a foreign tax credit equal to the lesser of the foreign
tax paid or the amount of tax on foreign profits due to the United States
(profits taxable in the United States times the U.S. statutory rate of 35
percent). Therefore, the company operating a branch in country A can
offset its U.S. tax burden by $75 (the lesser of $75 or $175), which results
in an amount payable to the United States of $100 ($175 — $75). Conse-
quently, this company faces an overall tax rate equal to the U.S. statutory
rate of 35 percent ($75 of foreign taxes plus $100 of U.S. taxes, or $175 in
total, divided by total profits of $500).
Suppose the company operates in a country whose tax rate exceeds that
of the United States: for example, country B in Table 1, which has a 40
percent corporate tax rate. In that case, the company cannot take a credit
equal to the full amount of taxes paid to the foreign country (see Table
1, column II). It generates "excess foreign tax credits," which can be first
carried back to offset its U.S. tax on foreign income in the prior two years
and then carried forward to offset its U.S. tax on foreign income in the
next five years. If the company operates a branch in both country A and
country B (Table 1, column III), then the foreign tax credit can be used
to offset the total tax due from all countries. Consequently, the excess
foreign tax credits in one country offset the foreign tax "deficit" in
another.
The same tax laws apply to subsidiaries, with one major exception—
the United States taxes only the earnings repatriated to the United States.
1
Likewise, the company receives a foreign tax credit based solely on the
repatriated amount, not the total amount of total foreign earnings. Col-
umns IV-VII of Table 1 show the taxation process for subsidiaries in low-
tax and high-tax countries, as well as the case when the corporation has
1 In these simple examples, we ignore Subpart F income, which can subject foreign income
to U.S. taxation before repatriation.246 Collins & Shackelford
both branches and subsidiaries. Note that U.S. multinationals will pay tax
on their worldwide income at the higher of the U.S. statutory rate or the
foreign tax rate. Therefore, incorporating in a country with a tax rate
lower than that of the United States could result in substantial tax savings.
Given the numerous, complex restrictions, as well as opportunities, em-
bedded in the taxation of non-U.S. income of U.S. multinationals, the mag-
nitude of the ultimate tax burden borne by U.S. multinationals becomes
an empirical question. The purposes of this paper are to review the extant
empirical evidence related to inferences of a U.S. multinational's "tax
competitiveness" and to offer new evidence comparing the average tax
rates of U.S. multinationals to both U.S. domestics and to non-U.S. multi-
nationals. In assessing evidence related to whether the U.S. tax system
results in U.S. companies becoming attractive takeover targets for non-
U.S. companies, we review studies comparing the tax liabilities of U.S.
companies that are foreign-controlled to those that are U.S.-controlled.
Next, we discuss evidence related to inversions, a technique recently used
by some U.S. companies to accomplish a "foreign" takeover without an
acquisition. Finally, we provide new data on the cost of U.S. domicile for
multinationals for the years 1992 to 1997. These new data update and
expand our 1995 findings (Collins and Shackelford, 1995), in which we
compared the average tax rates of U.S. multinationals to domestic-only
companies' average tax rates and to U.K. and Canadian multinationals'
average tax rates during the 1980s. Because of substantial changes in inter-
national business and tax since the 1980s, this update enables us to test
whether the tax costs of being a U.S. multinational have changed since
that time.
2. BACKGROUND
Which companies are taxed as U.S. multinationals? A company has U.S.
tax residence if it is legally incorporated in the United States. Thus, a
multinational's worldwide operations fall under the U.S. tax umbrella if
the parent company is incorporated in the United States. Multinational
companies typically integrate their worldwide operations. Thus, a multi-
national company with a U.S. parent likely purchases a large fraction of
its inputs from non-U.S. suppliers, sells a large fraction of its output to
non-U.S. buyers, and employs a large fraction of its labor and capital out-
side the United States. Coca-Cola, for instance, is a U.S.-domiciled firm
subject to U.S. taxation on its worldwide profits, even though most of its
sales, profits, property and employees are foreign-based. In short, the le-
gal location of a multinational's headquarters can disproportionately in-
fluence its worldwide tax liability.Do U.S. Multinationals Face Different Tax Burdens? 147
If a U.S. parent is purchased by a non-U.S. company, the portion of the
company remaining under the former U.S. parent in the legal organiza-
tional structure also remains under the U.S. tax umbrella. However, the
non-U.S. purchaser and its affiliates are outside the U.S. tax umbrella.
Thus, a non-U.S. company acquisition of a U.S. multinational could yield
more opportunity for restricting the reach of the U.S. tax umbrella.
U.S. multinationals can also avoid U.S. taxation on their foreign income
by engaging in inversions. In an inversion, the foreign income of the U.S.
parent is removed from the reach of the U.S. tax umbrella because of the
creation of a new company in a tax-advantageous location (e.g., Bermuda,
which has no corporate income tax) or using an existing company in such
a location to acquire the stock or assets of the U.S. parent. Most inversions
are taxable stock transfers where the new foreign parent company ex-
changes its own shares for shares of the American company, a transaction
triggering capital gains to the shareholders. At the conclusion of the trans-
fer, the shareholders own stock in the new foreign parent company, and
the American operations are typically organized as a subsidiary of the
new foreign parent.
2 To limit the reach of the U.S. tax umbrella, foreign
operations owned or controlled by the U.S. parent before the inversion are
transferred to a separate subsidiary of the new foreign parent company in
the inversion. Thus, dividends from foreign operations, previously re-
ceived by the U.S. parent (and subject to U.S. taxation), will now be re-
ceived by the new foreign parent. In short, inversions are the latest
innovation to avoid U.S. taxation of foreign-source income. This innova-
tion leads us to investigate the extent to which U.S. tax policy places U.S.
companies at a disadvantage in the global market.
3. DO TAXES MAKE U.S. COMPANIES
ATTRACTIVE TAKEOVER TARGETS?
If the U.S. taxation of multinational business proves particularly onerous,
then we would expect non-U.S. companies to acquire U.S. companies and
free them from the excess burdens associated with American international
taxation. In other words, does the potential for a reduction in post-acquisi-
tion taxable income (following acquisition by a non-U.S. company) place
U.S. companies at a disadvantage in the market for corporate control?
2 In an asset inversion, the assets of the U.S. parent and of any affiliates are transferred to
the foreign entity in exchange for stock in the foreign entity. The U.S. entity recognizes
taxable gains/losses equivalent to the fair market value less the basis of the assets. The U.S.
entity is subsequently liquidated, and the foreign entity shares are distributed to the public
shareholders.148 Collins & Shackelford
This section reviews recent and ongoing research that attempts to answer
this question.
Grubert, Goodspeed, and Swenson (1993); Grubert (1999); and Collins,
Kemsley, and Shackelford (1997) compare foreign-controlled domestic
(U.S.) corporations (FCDCs) to U.S.-domiciled companies. Each examines
actual corporate tax returns. All find that FCDCs face lower U.S. effective
rates than do similar domestic companies. Although this evidence can
suggest that U.S. companies are attractive takeover targets, none docu-
ments a direct link between tax management and the domicile of the
shareholders.
Examining tax returns from 1980 to 1987, Grubert, Goodspeed, and
Swenson (1993) document that FCDCs report lower levels of taxable in-
come than do domestic-controlled companies. They also report that the
taxable incomes of FCDCs are likely to persist around zero for many years.
Both findings are consistent with foreign-controlled U.S. companies man-
aging their tax liabilities to avoid taxes more than other U.S. companies.
Grubert, Goodspeed, and Swenson (1995) attempt to explain the differ-
ence between foreign-controlled and domestic-controlled firms. They re-
port that one-half of the difference is attributable to observable nontax
factors, such as exchange rate fluctuation, firm size, and age. The re-
maining half cannot be assigned to any observable factor. The unac-
counted-for half of the differential may arise because of transfer pricing
or other manipulation of FCDCs' U.S. taxable income.
The difference also may arise, however, from one or more of several
possible nontax explanations. For example, foreigners could be at a disad-
vantage in the market for corporate control. They could accept lower re-
turns to garner market share. Unfamiliar with the U.S. market, they may
encounter more unanticipated losses. These explanations seem as compel-
ling as tax management.
Grubert (1999) extends Grubert, Goodspeed, and Swenson's (1995)
study using tax returns from a more recent period: 1987 to 1993. Besides
the issues evaluated in Grubert, Goodspeed, and Swenson (1995), Grubert
(1999) considers significant minority shareholdings (25-50 percent) by
foreigners, transactions with offshore affiliates, different types of income,
and alternative econometric specifications. The inferences are unchanged
from Grubert, Goodspeed, and Swenson (1995). FCDCs continue to report
lower levels of taxable income than do domestic-controlled companies.
FCDCs' taxable incomes are also more likely to persist around zero. Again
approximately half of the foreign-domestic differential can be explained
by observable nontax factors. One new finding is that FCDCs (most of
which are 100 percent foreign-owned) exhibit levels of profitability simi-
lar to 25-50 percent foreign-controlled domestic firms, which suggestsDo U.S. Multinationals Face Different Tax Burdens? 149
that the role of foreign ownership in determining taxable income levels
may be less clear.
Collins, Kemsley, and Shackelford (1997) also extend Grubert,
Goodspeed, and Swenson (1995) by attempting to determine whether the
FCDCs' persistence around zero taxable income arises from a specific tax
management opportunity, transfer price manipulation. Collins, Kemsley,
and Shackelford (1997) examine the U.S. tax returns of FCDC wholesale
traders from 1981 to 1990. They concentrate on this sector because the
wholesale trade production function is relatively simple and companies
can manipulate taxable income by managing the prices charged between
the foreign manufacturer and the U.S. distributor. Collins, Kemsley, and
Shackelford (1997) hypothesize that if FCDCs are managing taxable in-
come, then sales (determined by external markets) and cost of goods sold
(determined by internal prices) should decouple. When the distributor's
U.S. taxable income rises above (falls below) zero, then the foreign parent
increases (decreases) the costs of inventory. By focusing on a sector pur-
ported to engage in transfer price manipulation and the account through
which such manipulation should occur, Collins, Kemsley, and Shackel-
ford (1997) provides a powerful test of the tax management implied in
Grubert, Goodspeed, and Swenson (1995).
Collins, Kemsley, and Shackelford (1997) find that the relation between
sales and cost of goods sold in the tax returns of foreign-owned U.S.
wholesalers maintaining near-zero taxable income does not differ from
the relation found in the consolidated financial statements of other com-
panies. The control groups include U.S.-controlled wholesalers, foreign-
domiciled wholesalers, and the parents of the sample firms. Collins, Kem-
sley, and Shackelford (1997) conclude that, at least for wholesalers and
inventory purchases, the documented persistence around zero taxable in-
come found by Grubert, Goodspeed, and Swenson (1995) cannot be linked
to transfer price management. The failure of such a strong research design
to detect manipulation raises doubts about whether any of Grubert,
Goodspeed, and Swenson's (1995) and Grubert's (1999) unaccounted for
differential is attributable to more aggressive tax planning by foreign-
owned U.S. companies.
An inherent weakness of the settings investigated in the preceding
studies is that shareholder domicile cannot be assigned randomly among
firms. Without controlling for the underlying differences between FCDCs
and domestic-controlled U.S. firms, differences in taxable income may be
erroneously attributed to tax planning.
Blouin, Collins, and Shackelford (2002) employ a research design that
better isolates the influence of domicile on taxes. Rather than comparing
a large set of FCDCs with domestic-controlled firms that may differ along250 Collins & Shackelford
many facets, they compare changes in pre- and postacquisition taxable
income for U.S. firms acquired by U.S. companies to those acquired by
non-U.S. companies. They are unable to find any evidence that the domi-
cile of an acquirer affects the postacquisition taxable income of its target.
Specifically, Blouin, Collins, and Shackelford (2002) compare the actual
corporate tax returns of U.S.-domiciled companies before and after their
acquisition by foreign firms with the actual corporate tax returns of simi-
lar U.S.-domiciled companies before and after their acquisition by other
U.S. firms. By conditioning on pre-acquisition taxable income, this differ-
ence-in-differences approach controls for firm-specific tax and nontax fac-
tors that predate the acquisition, enhancing the power of the tests to assess
whether taxes vary between foreign and domestic shareholders.
Since the firms that are acquired are necessarily non-random, Blouin,
Collins, and Shackelford (2002) match the tax returns of 31 firms that were
acquired in 1996 by non-U.S. shareholders for more than $50 million with
the tax returns of 31 targets of similar size, industry, and compensation
(stock-for-stock versus cash purchase) acquired in 1996 by U.S.-domiciled
firms. Average target taxable income (as a percentage of acquisition price)
in the two years following the acquisition (1997 and 1998) is compared
to average target taxable income in the two years preceding the acquisi-
tion (1994 and 1995). For firms purchased by non-U.S. companies, the
mean taxable income increases 3.25 percent. The mean increase for do-
mestic targets is 0.85 percent. Thus, taxable income increases following
acquisition for both foreign firms and domestic firms, a finding likely at-
tributable to increased corporate profitability in the late 1990s. Contrary
to claims that foreign acquisitions lead to lower tax revenues than do
domestic acquisitions, however, the increase in taxable income for firms
acquired by foreign firms exceeds the increase in taxable income for tar-
gets acquired by U.S. firms, although the difference is not statistically sig-
nificant at conventional levels. Similarly, regression analyses fail to detect
any significant influence exerted by domicile of the purchaser on changes
in taxable income post-acquisition. No evidence is provided to support
claims that foreign acquisitions result in disproportionate tax reductions
compared with domestic acquisitions and thus claims that taxes make
U.S. companies attractive takeover targets.
We also gathered anecdotal evidence consistent with these inferences.
We conducted private discussions with tax officials at Daimler-Chrysler
and with tax scholars and practitioners in Germany to assess the extent to
which worldwide taxation in the United States contributed to the merged
entity adopting a German parent. Leblang (1998) and others had specu-
lated that Chrysler Corporation and Daimler-Benz AG chose Germany as
the worldwide headquarters of the merged company to restrict the reachDo U.S. Multinationals Face Different Tax Burdens? 151
of the U.S. worldwide tax umbrella. Unlike the United States, which taxes
worldwide income, Germany is a territorial country and does not impose
tax on the non-German income of its German-based multinationals.
Our sources indicated that taxes were a secondary consideration in the
decision. The dominant factor was that the German labor unions threat-
ened to veto the merger unless the resulting entity was German-based.
In fact, the most important tax consideration did not involve corporate
income taxation. Instead, it related to shareholder taxes. The swap of
Daimler-Benz shares for an American-domiciled parent would have been
a taxable event for German shareholders. Conversely, the swap of
Chrysler shares for a German-domiciled parent was not a taxable event
for U.S. investors. By exchanging shares for a German-domiciled parent,
the Daimler-Benz shareholders deferred taxation on the appreciation in
their shares. Although reportedly of marginal importance, the territorial
tax structure provided under German law apparently was perceived to
have some value. Subsequent to the merger, DaimlerChrysler reorganized
the company and stripped Chrysler of its foreign subsidiaries to avoid
U.S. repatriation taxes.
4. INVERSIONS: FOREIGN DOMICILE
WITHOUT AN ACQUISITION
Desai and Hines (2002) examine inversions, the most recent technique for
U.S. companies to accomplish a "foreign" takeover and thus remove their
foreign operations from the reach of the U.S. tax umbrella. Inversions (or
corporate expatriations) are a visible symbol of the tax cost of being a
U.S. multinational and have created considerable political attention. In
fact, Congress is currently considering legislation that would deny to
companies the tax benefits of expatriating and the right to bid on U.S.
government contracts.
Desai and Hines (2002) find only seven members of the Standard &
Poor's 500 index have expatriated or announced plans to expatriate. Stan-
ley Works, the company they examine in-depth, announced plans to expa-
triate in February 2002. On August 1, 2002, however, Stanley Works
announced that, in response to criticism from employees, investors, and
public officials, they were abandoning their plans to acquire a Bermuda
address. Desai and Hines (2002) also find that larger companies—those
with extensive foreign assets, those with considerable debt, and those op-
erating in low-tax foreign jurisdictions—are the most likely to expatriate.
They suggest that this evidence is consistent with inversions motivated
by the U.S. policy of taxing worldwide income and foreign tax credit re-
strictions, such as the interest allocation rules. Desai and Hines (2002)252 Collins & Shackelford
conclude that, while the limited number of companies engaging in inver-
sions likely saves substantial taxes, most companies do not find the po-
tential corporate-level tax savings sufficient to offset shareholder-level
capital gains tax liabilities on the transaction.
It is worth noting that, as with DaimlerChrysler, some of the companies
engaging in inversions may have nontax incentives. Insurance companies,
for example, may benefit from less restrictive regulation if they domicile
outside the United States. In short, the small number of inversions to date
and the potentially mixed incentives of those that have expatriated are
consistent with the U.S. worldwide tax system being not burdensome
enough to motivate widespread inversions if no legislation is enacted.
5. THE TAX COST OF U.S. DOMICILE: NEW
EVIDENCE
5.1 Motivation
The remainder of this paper estimates and compares the tax costs attribut-
able to domiciling in the United States with four other leading industrial
countries: Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. In the spirit
of Grubert's (1999) update of Grubert, Goodspeed, and Swenson (1995),
we assess whether these costs changed during the 1990s by comparing
our new estimates with the ones we computed in our 1995 study (Collins
and Shackelford, 1995) using data from the 1980s.
An update is warranted because sweeping economic, political, and
technological changes occurred in the 1990s. The changes include, among
others, increased globalization, computerization, deregulation, the spread
of democracy and market economies, multinational trade affiliations, and
cross-border corporate mergers and acquisitions. North American and
European capital markets boomed; Japan suffered recession. Countries
altered their tax laws and enforcement, and talked of a major overhaul
of the taxation of multinationals. Firms responded with unprecedented
global tax planning. As a result, these changes raise doubts that empirical
evidence from the 1980s is useful in constructing tax policy today.
The results presented here are intended to contribute to the ongoing
policy discussions. Legislation seems imminent, if only to respond to the
WTO's ruling that the Extra-Territorial Income Exclusion (ETI) is an ille-
gal export subsidy. No consensus has emerged, however, for reforming
the U.S. international tax system. Some advocate fundamental interna-
tional tax reform, including shifting to a territorial system. However, even
incremental changes, such as the current bill introduced by Chairman Bill
Thomas of the House Ways and Means Committee, have met heavy criti-Do U.S. Multinationals Face Different Tax Burdens? 153
cism. The Bush administration, which favors change, has committed to a
comprehensive study of U.S. international tax competitiveness next year
(Johnston, 2002). The findings from this study should contribute to that
debate.
Because this paper is an update and extension of Collins and Shackel-
ford (1995), a review of that paper seems appropriate first. In 1995, we
estimated the costs of domicile by regressing average effective tax rates
(ATRs) on variables that indicate domicile in Canada, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. The coefficient on the individual country
variables is interpreted as an estimate of the marginal impact of a com-
pany's domicile on its worldwide tax burden, conditional on industry and
year. Data are collected from firm-level financial statements from 1982
to 1991. We concluded in 1995 that (1) domiciliary tax costs are ordered
from highest to lowest during this time period as follows: Japan, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada; and (2) U.S. and U.K.
multinationals face higher domiciliary tax costs than their domestic-only
counterparts.
To facilitate determining whether the domiciliary landscape has
changed in the last decade, we adopt an estimation procedure that follows
our 1995 study. Specifically, we regress ATRs on the original four coun-
tries, plus Germany, for 1992 to 1997, with controls for industry and year.
5.2 Measurement Challenges
Both Collins and Shackelford (1995) and this study face at least two major
challenges in developing reliable estimates. The first concerns the appro-
priate tax rate. The second concerns the use of financial statements as
proxies for corporate tax return information. We discussed each of the
hurdles in detail in Collins and Shackelford (1995). We provide an abbre-
viated review here.
With regard to the appropriate tax rate, marginal effective tax rates
capture incentives to employ new capital, while average effective tax rates
measure distributional burdens [see Fullerton (1984) and Bradford and
Fullerton (1981) for a more detailed discussion]. Neither method is with-
out fault, but we opt for average because of the following limitations asso-
ciated with marginal effective tax rates.
Marginal rates require numerous simplifying assumptions, including
assumptions about the tax status of shareholders; firm financing policies;
firm asset purchase decisions; and the reflection of inflation in asset prices,
interest rates, and economic depreciation rates. Simulated marginal effec-
tive tax rates are sensitive to the assumed discount rate and the effect of
inflation on nominal interest (Bradford and Fullerton, 1981). Furthermore,
simulated marginal tax rate methodologies are too broad to capture the254 Collins & Shackelford
important legal complexities in corporate tax systems and must combine,
via weighted average or some other technique, asset-specific marginal ef-
fective tax rates to yield inter-industry or other aggregated comparisons.
Slemrod and Timbers (1990) add that simulated marginal effective tax
rates provide only rough guidelines for tax policy analysis in complex
environments.
The other major challenge in the research design is our reliance on fi-
nancial statement disclosures to estimate corporate tax positions. Ideally,
we would examine the actual tax filings in all countries for a large set of
multinationals around the globe. Unfortunately, such data are not avail-
able. Thus, consistent with Collins and Shackelford (1995), this analysis
depends on an imperfect source, income tax information contained in the
footnotes of financial statements, as provided by Standard & Poor's
Global Vantage international financial database.
Estimating ATRs with financial statement data is problematic. As has
been widely publicized in the recent accounting scandals, such as those
involving Enron and WorldCom, U.S. generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples (GAAP), which govern financial statement disclosures, can differ
substantially from the tax accounting rules provided in the Internal Reve-
nue Code. In the United States, corporations prepare two sets of books—
one tax and one financial. Under such a system, book-tax differences
inevitably arise. The book-tax gap appears to be increasing (Manzon and
Plesko, 2002) and, according to Mills et al. (2002), is most pronounced for
multinationals.
In the United States, a primary source of the increasing spread is the
exercise of nonqualified stock options, which typically generates a tax
deduction but no charge to book earnings (Desai, 2002; Hanlon and Shev-
lin, 2002; Graham, Lang, and Shackelford, 2002). Other causes for the
book-tax difference include consolidation differences and tax shelters
(McGill and Outslay, 2002), inconsistent accounting choices across firms,
timing differences between tax and financial filings that result in tax esti-
mates being used in financial statements, and changes due to IRS audits
(Plesko, 2003).
The book-tax differences vary across countries, which confounds our
attempts to compare cross-country data. For example, book-tax distinc-
tions are less important in Germany, where a single set of books are main-
tained for both financial reporting and tax at the individual company
level. Even in Germany, however, the book-tax conformity does not ex-
tend to the consolidation of separate company books into a single set of
consolidated financial statements.
Besides book-tax differences, ATRs computed using accounting disclo-
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This limitation prevents us from incorporating differences in shareholder
and corporate tax integration. Despite the difficulties involved with using
financial statement disclosures to estimate tax burdens, we follow innu-
merable studies in concluding that financial statement information is at
least somewhat informative in estimating corporate tax burdens [see
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) for a more detailed discussion]. The alter-
native is no firm-level analysis because large samples of tax returns from
companies and countries is not available and likely will not be for the
foreseeable future.
5.3 Comparative Average Effective Tax Rates
Ideally, we would measure average effective tax rates as current and dis-
counted future worldwide explicit and implicit income taxes divided by
current worldwide economic income. Unfortunately, neither the numera-
tor nor denominator of this ideal measure is observable. Following our
1995 study, we approximate the numerator (taxes) using current income
taxes paid or payable for the year on earnings as determined for financial
accounting purposes. This amount is computed from Global Vantage data
as total tax provision (TXT) less deferred income taxes (TXDI) and less
other taxes (TXO). The total tax provision is the tax expense based on
financial statement income.
No accounting earnings computation perfectly measures true economic
income. We estimate the effective tax rate denominator using two alterna-
tive measures from Collins and Shackelford (1995). The first is net income
before taxes, appropriations to untaxed reserves, minority interest in-
come, and extraordinary items (NIBT), which is the Global Vantage data
item pretax income (PI). This measure is tainted, however, by intercountry
differences in financial reporting practices and accounting methods used
to measure items such as depreciation, goodwill amortization, pension
expense, and research and development expense.
3
To achieve greater comparability across countries, we compute a sec-
ond effective tax rate measure using adjusted net income (ADJNI) in the
denominator. Adjusted net income is NIBT plus depreciation and amorti-
zation (Global Vantage data item DP), goodwill write-offs (Global Vantage
data item GWO), pension expense (Global Vantage data item XPR), and
research and development expenses (Global Vantage data item XRD).
4
3 See Collins and Shackelford (1995) for an extensive discussion of these differences in fi-
nancial reporting practices in Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
4 We also estimated effective tax rates in 1995 (Collins and Shackelford, 1995) using total
revenue (Global Vantage data item REVT) in the denominator. We conclude that, while the
total revenue measure eliminates intercountry differences in accounting for expenses, its
implicit assumption that true profit margins are constant across firms from five different156 Collins & Shackelford
The sample includes all Global Vantage companies domiciled in Can-
ada, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States from
1992 to 1997 with positive net revenues; any nonzero value (positive or
negative) for net income before taxes; and nonnegative values for depreci-
ation, goodwill write-offs, pension expense, and research and develop-
ment expense. Companies are also excluded if current taxes or the
industry code (SIC) are missing. The resulting sample comprises 22,880
company-years: 1,436 in Canada, 1,858 in Germany, 3,372 in Japan, 4,660
in the United Kingdom, and 11,554 in the United States.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for certain income statement and
balance sheet items across countries. Sample firms vary considerably
across countries. As we documented for the 1980s in Collins and Shackel-
ford (1995), Japanese companies report higher revenues and lower profit
margins than did companies from the other countries. The mean revenue
(REV) for a Japanese company is $5.5 billion, over one and a half times
as large as the mean revenue of firms domiciled in Germany and three
to seven times as large as the mean revenue of firms domiciled in the
other countries. On average, U.S. companies' revenues are larger than
U.K. companies' revenues, which are larger than Canadian companies'
revenues.
Mean NIBT for Japanese companies is $126 million, less than the $142
million average for U.S. companies and only slightly larger than the mean
for German and British companies. This dollar amount compares with a
$196 million Japanese mean in our 1995 study, which was more than dou-
ble the income from any other country. Japanese profit margins (NIBT/
REV) trail other countries' profit margins. The mean NIBT /REV for Japa-
nese companies is 2.3 percent, compared to 6.6 percent for Canadian, 3.8
percent for Germany, 8.5 percent for British, and 7.4 percent for U.S. com-
panies. After-tax profit margins differ even more. The mean (NIBT-TAX) /
REV for Japan is 0.9 percent, far less than the 4.2 percent in Canada, 2.4
percent in Germany, 5.6 percent in the United Kingdom, and the 4.7 per-
cent in the United States.
Consistent with their larger size, Japanese companies report larger tax
payments per firm. The mean of current domestic plus foreign income
taxes (TAX) for Japanese companies is $77 million, 1.5 to 4 times the
amount for companies from the other countries. Conversely, Japanese
companies report the lowest mean current plus deferred foreign income
taxes (i.e., foreign tax provision, or FORTAX). FORTAX as a percentage
of ADJNI ranges from 0.2 percent for Japanese companies to 7.5 percent
countries and a host of industries produces unreliable estimates. We reach the same conclu-
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for U.K. companies. However, these numbers appear suspect. The per-
centage of companies reporting nonzero foreign tax provisions varies
greatly by country: 13.9 percent of the Canadian companies, 1.9 percent
of German companies, 0.2 percent of Japanese companies; 52.7 percent of
U.K. companies; and 36.6 percent of U.S. companies. In 1995, we detected
similar variation, which we attributed to differences in financial statement
practices across countries rather than actual foreign tax payments.
The sample firms are similar across countries in depreciation expense,
consistent with our 1995 study. Unlike companies domiciled in the other
three countries, Japanese and German companies are required to expense
for financial accounting purposes the same amount of depreciation that
they deduct on their tax returns. If they adopt the most accelerated depre-
ciation method available for tax purposes, their book depreciation likely
will exceed the book depreciation expenses reported in other countries.
However, the mean depreciation as a percentage of mean revenues for
Japanese companies is 4.0 percent and for German companies it is 6.6
percent, which is comparable with the ratios in the other countries: 7.4
percent (Canada), 4.2 percent (United Kingdom), and 4.9 percent (United
States).
Table 3 provides summary statistics on the sample companies by one-
digit SIC codes. Over half the companies are manufacturers (SICs 2 and
3), the predominant industry for all countries. The next most common
industry is trade (SIC 5), comprising 14 percent of the sample. Countries
are not represented equally across industries. Compared with other coun-
tries, disproportionate industry concentrations include Canadian mining
and construction firms (26 percent of all Canadian companies), Japanese
and German manufacturers (63 and 67 percent, respectively), and British
traders (18 percent). Companies from the United States form a plurality
in every industry.
Table 4 provides summary statistics of average tax rates from 1992 to
1997 by country. ATRNIBT (or ATRADJNI) is total current income taxes, TAX,
divided by NIBT (or by ADJNI). To exclude unrealistic measures, average
effective tax rate observations are truncated from below at zero, and from
above at 70 percent.
Mean average effective tax rates in panel A of Table 4 are strikingly
similar to the estimates in Collins and Shackelford (1995). For example,
U.S. mean ATRNIBT is 0.26 from 1992-1997 versus 0.25 from 1982-1991.
Similarly, U.S. mean ATRADJNI is 0.16 from 1992-1997 versus 0.17 from
1982-1991. Japanese companies remain the most heavily taxed (mean
ATRNIBT = 0.44 and ATRADJNI = 0.22), while Canadian companies continue to face the lowest average effective tax rates (mean ATRNIBT = 0.18 and
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similar: 0.28 and 0.14, respectively for German firms and 0.26 and 0.19,
respectively, for British firms.
Panel B of Table 4 reports the same statistics for our selection of multi-
national companies, those that report nonzero amounts of foreign current
and deferred income taxes (FORTAX). Unfortunately, multinational com-
panies are not identified by Global Vantage. Thus, following our 1995
study, we assume that the 6,927 company-years with nonzero values for
FORT AX are multinationals. Although we are aware of no other indicator
of foreign activity that is commonly reported across most countries (e.g.,
foreign sales or assets), this assumption is problematic for at least two
reasons: (1) multinationals need not pay or recover foreign taxes, and (2)
many German and Japanese financial statements exclude foreign subsid-
iary operations and reflect only the parent companies' operations, likely
contributing to the fact that only 2 percent (0.2 percent) of German (Japa-
nese) companies report nonzero foreign taxes. Consequently, we restrict
the discussion of multinationals to those U.S., British, and Canadian firms
that report foreign tax information in their financial statements, although
these companies may not comprise the entire population of multinational
firms.
The relative cross-country tax burdens for the multinationals in panel
B are similar to the patterns documented in the full sample in panel A
and in the 1982-1991 analysis in our 1995 study. Canadian multinationals
report lower effective tax rates than do U.S. and British multinationals.
Mean effective tax rates from U.S. and U.K. multinationals are greater
than for domestic-only companies. For example, U.S. multinationals (do-
mestics) report mean ATRNIBT and ATRADJNI of 0.30 (0.23) and 0.18 (0.15), respectively.
5 Thus, this univariate analysis of effective tax rates suggests
that U.S. multinationals face heavier tax burdens than do U.S. companies
without foreign operations.
These estimates are consistent with U.S. multinationals facing higher
tax burdens than domestic-only firms. This situation could occur because
the tax law inadvertently taxes multinationals more heavily. For example,
the provisions governing foreign tax credits may not achieve their pur-
pose of fully eliminating double taxation. However, we cannot rule out
at least two other explanations for multinationals facing higher effective
tax rates. First, the foreign profits could arise in countries with higher tax
5 The domestic-only statistics are computed by subtracting the multinational figures in panel
B from the overall figures in panel A. For example, domestic-only ATRNIBT of 0.23 is:
[(11554 X 0.26) - (4225 X 0.30)]
(11,554 - 4,225)262 Collins & Shackelford
rates than in the United States. Second, multinationals may inherently be
better-managed firms and thus have higher profits. If so, this characteris-
tic would explain why their tax burdens are heavier (they are more
profitable) and also why they can expand into foreign markets success-
fully when their domestic peers cannot.
5.4 Regression Results
To assess further the relation between average effective tax rates and the
country of domicile, the following pooled, cross-sectional regression
equation is estimated:




ATR,f = total current income taxes (TAX) for company i in year t
divided by INCOME, where INCOME is measured as: (1)
net income before taxes (NIBT) or (2) net income before
taxes plus depreciation, amortization, goodwill write-
offs, pension expense, and research and development ex-
pense (ADJNI);
COUNTRY, = categorical variable that equals 1 if company i in year t
is domiciled in country j, where ; = 1 to 5 for Canada,
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United
States;
MNj( = categorical variable equal to 1 if the foreign tax provision
(current plus deferred foreign taxes) for company i for
year t is not equal to 0;
INDUSTRY,, = categorical variable equal to 1 if the two-digit SIC for
company i in year t is the two-digit SIC for industry k,
where k = 1 to m, encompassing all two-digit SICs
spanned by companies i = 1 to n;
YEAR,-f = categorical variable equal to 1 if year t for company i is
the same as year p, where p = 1992 to 1997;
UNCON,-t = categorical variable equal to 1 if the income statement for
company i in year t is unconsolidated.
Note that the intercept term is suppressed in the regression equation.
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sure the marginal cost of domiciling in a specific country. For example,
the difference between the United States and the Japan coefficient repre-
sents the difference in tax rates that a given firm would expect to face if
it changed domicile.
Of course, this interpretation ignores any nontax considerations in do-
micile choice. Suppose the cost of capital is lower for Japanese companies
because of the high savings rate in Japan, but its tax burdens are no differ-
ent. If this assumption is true, Japanese-domiciled companies may have
an inherent advantage compared with multinationals from other coun-
tries. This advantage could translate into higher profitability and thus
higher tax payments. We could interpret these findings erroneously as a
heavier tax burden on Japanese companies, although Japanese tax bur-
dens might be no different from other countries' burdens. If this were the
case, a U.S. company could relocate to Japan, gain access to this cheaper
capital source, improve its profitability, and soon appear to face heavier
taxation, when in reality Japanese and U.S. taxes are not different. There-
fore, the regression coefficient estimates may fail to capture the intended
tax cost of domicile. We attempt to address this potential omitted-corre-
lated-variable problem by including control variables for industry, years,
and whether or not the financials are consolidated. As with most empiri-
cal work, however, the risk remains that an important correlated determi-
nant has been omitted from the regression.
Similarly, the estimated coefficients for COUNTRY X MN are designed
to reveal whether domicile for multinationals within a country is more
costly than domicile for domestics in that country. The sum of the COUN-
TRY and COUNTRY X MN coefficients measure the average percentage
of income taxes paid by a multinational in a particular domicile.
Table 5 reports the estimates of the regression coefficients for the vari-
ables of interest in equation (1). The results are consistent with Japanese
companies facing higher domiciliary tax costs than do companies from
other countries. When ATRNIBT is the dependent variable, domicile in Can-
ada increases average effective tax rates by 17 percent; in Germany, by
25 percent; in Japan, by 41 percent; in the United Kingdom, by 19 percent;
and in the United States, by 20 percent. Similarly, when ATRADJNI is the
dependent variable, Japanese domicile results in a greater increase to the
effective rate than domicile in any of the other countries (20 percent for
Japan versus 11-15 percent for the other countries).
The incremental tax cost associated with Japanese domicile—41 (or 20)
percent, using ATRNIBT (or ATRADJNI)—is down slightly from our 1995
estimate of 43 (or 21) percent. Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
United States, however, experienced increases. For example, the cost of164 Collins & Shackelford
TABLE 5
Pooled Cross-Sectional Regression Results from Estimating Equation



































































* Estimated coefficients on the COUNTRY variables measure the marginal cost of domiciling in a specific
country.
t Estimated coefficients for COUNTRY X MN indicate whether domicile for multinationals within a
country is more costly than domicile for domestics in that country.
X ATRMIBT is total current income taxes scaled by net income before taxes.
§ ATRADJN is total current income taxes scaled by net income before taxes, depreciation, goodwill amorti-
zation, pension expense, and research and development expense.
U.S. domicile increased from 15 percent to 20 percent using ATRNIBT/ and
from 8 percent to 14 percent using ATRADJNi.
Examination of the estimated COUNTRY X MN coefficients suggests
that U.S. and British multinationals face higher average tax burdens than
domiciled firms in those countries that avoid foreign activities.
6 Using
ATRNIBT as the dependent variable, the COUNTRY X MN estimates for
the United States and the United Kingdom are positive and significant,
indicating that the tax burden levied on the NIBT of U.S. multinationals
is 7 percentage points higher than that levied on their domestic counter-
parts and 8 percentage points higher for U.K. multinationals than for U.K.
domestics-only. In other words, on average, U.S. multinationals pay 37
percent more of their NIBT (or 22 percent of ADJNI) in taxes than do
domestic-only U.S. corporations.
7
6 Recall that the data are incapable of identifying most Japanese and German multinationals,
so the discussion centers on multinationals in the other countries.
7 This percentage increase is computed by dividing the coefficient for COUNTRY X MN
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Conversely, the regression coefficients suggest that Canadian multina-
tionals face insignificantly different tax burdens than do Canadian domes-
tic-only companies. This finding may reflect the fact that Canada operates
a territorial tax system (thus alleviating any potential double taxation)
with regard to foreign direct investment in large trading partner coun-
tries, such as the United States.
The U.S. and U.K. multinational tax differential has increased since the
1980s, when we found in our 1995 study that U.S. and U.K. multinationals
face 4 percentage point higher average effective tax rates than their do-
mestic counterparts, suggesting U.S. (U.K.) multinationals paid 30 (23)
percent more of their NIBT in taxes from 1982-1991. We infer from the
regression results that U.S. and U.K. multinationals are shouldering an
increasingly disproportionate percentage of corporate tax burdens.
The US X MN (UK X MN) coefficients imply that the annual tax bill of
the average American (British) company in this study would increase
from $9 to $18 (from $8 to $10) million if it were a multinational rather than
a domestic corporation. These estimates are up from the $3 to $4 million
increase for the multinationals in both countries in our 1995 study.
5.5 Variation Across Industries
We also estimated pooled, cross-sectional regression coefficient estimates
for each one-digit SIC numbered 1-7 (results are untabulated). When the
dependent variables are ATRNIBT and ATRADJNI, Japanese domicile indi-
cates higher effective tax rates in every industry. We also find that the
overall lower average tax rates in Canada are largely attributable to three
industries: mining and construction; finance, insurance, and real estate;
and services (SICs 1, 6, and 7, respectively).
The variability of tax burdens across sectors may be a useful measure
of within-country variation in industry tax incentives. If so, the United
Kingdom would appear to be the most successful at maintaining a level
playing field across industries. Using ATRNIBT, U.K. rates range from 0.18
(finance, insurance, and real estate) to 0.23 (trade), a spread of only 5
percent. U.S. rates range from 0.11 (mining and construction) to 0.26
(trade), a spread of 15 percent. German rates range from 0.20 (mining and
construction) to 0.37 (transportation and utilities), a spread of 17 percent.
Japanese rates range from 0.31 (finance, insurance, and real estate) to 0.49
(transportation and utilities), a spread of 18 percent. Canadian rates range
across sectors from 0.06 (mining and construction) to 0.24 (transportation
and utilities), a spread of 18 percent. Similarly, using ATRADJNI, the U.K.
range is only 4 percent, while other countries range from 10-13 percent.
Comparing U.S. ATRNIBT and ATRADJNI sector measures in this period to the findings in our 1995 study, mean effective tax rates have declined166 Collins & Shackelford
in every sector except transportation and utilities. From 1982 to 1991, the
regression coefficient for transportation and utilities was 0.15 0.09 percent
using ATRNIBT and ATRADJNI/ respectively. From 1992 to 1997, it was 0.24 (0.14) percent.
Using ATRNIBT (and ATRADJNi), U.S. multinational average effective tax
rates exceed domestic-only tax rates in every sector and are significantly
larger everywhere except for trade (and for transportation and utilities
when using ATRADJNI). U.S. multinationals in the finance, insurance, and
real estate sector face the largest differential tax rate compared to their
domestic counterparts. Using ATRNIBT (ATRADJNI), the regression coeffi-
cient implies effective tax rates are 12 (10) percentage points higher for
U.S. finance, insurance, and real estate multinationals than they are for
U.S. domestics. This finding contrasts with the 1 (4) percentage point
spread in our 1995 study, when multinationals in mining and construction
faced the largest differential.
Using ATRNIBT and ATRADJNI, U.K. multinational average effective tax
rates exceed domestic-only tax rates in every sector and are highly sig-
nificantly greater in all except mining and construction. Excluding mining
and construction, the differentials range from 6-11 (3-8) percentage
points using ATRNIBT (ATRADJNI). U.K. multinational spreads are up in ev-
ery sector. We reported in 1995 that the maximum differential in any sec-
tor was 6 (3) using ATRNIBT (ATRADJNI).
5.6 Robustness Checks
The findings in this study are robust when subjected to a battery of speci-
fication tests, with the exception of the final test reported below. Conclu-
sions previously reported are unchanged when UNCON is deleted,
average effective tax rates are allowed to exceed 70 percent, the multina-
tional categorical variable is deleted, revenues are added as an explana-
tory variable to capture company size differences, and all observations
with negative income are excluded. In the last sensitivity test, we exclude
all observations for which there is not a positive tax payment. Conclusions
drawn from the coefficients on the COUNTRY variable are unchanged.
However, results differ from the prior multinational estimates. The US X
MN and UK X MN coefficients are less than one-third of the coefficients
reported in Table 5, and the US X MN coefficient is insignificant when
ATRADJNI is the dependent variable. Thus, the U.S. multinational tax differ-
ential is quite sensitive to the inclusion of companies receiving tax refunds
or generating net operating loss carryforwards. This finding suggests that
domestic net operating losses are largely responsible for the prior infer-
ences that U.S. multinationals pay significantly higher taxes than their
domestic-only counterparts. This finding is consistent with the differenceDo U.S. Multinationals Face Different Tax Burdens? 167
between multinationals and domestics being one of profitability, not tax-
ation. Multinationals face higher taxes because they are inherently more
profitable firms.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Few areas of public policy are under as much pressure from changing
technology and a global capital market as the U.S. system of taxing multi-
national corporations. This unraveling has been recently highlighted by
WTO decisions and corporate inversions, but the entire area of taxation
has long needed careful rethinking. This paper attempts to estimate the
tax costs of being a U.S. multinational.
We find that companies domiciled in the U.S. face higher tax burdens
than do U.S. domestic-only companies, higher tax burdens than do Cana-
dian multinationals, and tax burdens similar to those of British multina-
tionals. Our prior evidence and the new evidence presented here is
consistent with at least some U.S. companies facing heavier tax burdens
because they are globally positioned.
Given the many changes in business and taxes during the 1990s, we
find remarkably similar results to our 1995 study. The trend is increased
tax burdens outside Japan and particularly so for U.S. and British multina-
tionals. Japanese companies continue to have higher average effective tax
rates, but less so than in the 1980s. Canada continues to have the lowest
tax rates. U.S. and British multinationals face increasingly greater tax bur-
dens than their domestic counterparts, particularly in the finance, insur-
ance, and real estate industry.
We close with two important caveats that are discussed in detail above.
First, these estimates are only as good as the ability of financial statement
disclosures to capture the tax position of firms. We use book numbers
because a multinational study of this nature cannot be conducted using
tax returns. Second, taxes are a function of profitability. To the extent our
analysis excludes variables that are correlated with profitability and thus
taxes, it is possible that we have misinterpreted the results.
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